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Abstract: A growing literature examines conditions under which financial incen-
tives for behavior change can undermine “crowd out” or reinforce (“crowd in”) 
other sources of motivation for the behavior in question. Some of this literature 
points to a potential role of social norms, but it has not attempted to quantify 
that role. We present an interdisciplinary model from economics and communica-
tion science that measures the effects of financial incentives on social norms and 
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their joint effects on behavior, including after incentives have ended. In a framed 
field experiment with Tibetan herders in Qinghai, China, we find that a temporary 
payment for participation in a patrol against illegal wildlife trapping reinforces 
a perceived injunctive norm that this conservation behavior meets with social 
approval. This norm remains heightened even after the payment has ended, con-
tinuing to positively influence the decision to participate in anti-trapping patrols 
in the experiment. This finding suggests that, under certain circumstances, a care-
fully framed incentive for conservation behavior can support injunctive norms in 
favor of conservation behavior.
Keywords: China, collective action, conservation behavior, payment for ecosys-
tem services, public good experiment, Qinghai, Sanjiangyuan
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1. Introduction
With the spread of payment for ecosystem services (PES) worldwide, recent years 
have seen growing interest in the importance of designing PES in a way that 
strengthens rather than competes with other sources of motivation regarding the 
behavior that it seeks to encourage (Bowles and Polánia-Reyes 2012; Kerr et al. 
2014; Rode et al. 2015; Brent et al. 2017; Moros et al. 2018). This is based on 
evidence that payments for behavior change can result in motivation crowding – 
undermining (crowding out) or reinforcing (crowding in) nonfinancial sources of 
motivation via the use of payments.
The effects of PES on other sources of motivation is important because incen-
tive payments for conservation tend to be financed by governments and donor 
agencies with budget pressures and changing priorities. Designing payments in 
a way that avoids undermining original pro-environment norms, especially when 
payments have ended, is critically important. Further, designing payments in a 
way that could yield positive impacts on behavior even after the payments have 
ended would be a major feat for conservation policy. However, without a better 
theoretical understanding of what drives motivation crowding out and crowding 
in, it will be difficult to devise behavioral payment programs with optimal long-
term properties.
Some discussions of motivation crowding point to a possible role of social 
norms – that behavioral change payments such as PES alter the social norms 
regarding the behavior in question (Vatn 2009; Bowles and Polánia-Reyes 2012; 
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Bremer et al. 2014; Farrow et al. 2017; Moros et al. 2018). To our knowledge, 
however, this literature has not attempted to quantify the effects of payments on 
social norms, nor the effects of the interaction of payments and norms on the 
behavior that PES aims to influence.
Addressing this gap, Lapinski et al. (2017) presented and tested a model of 
Financial Incentives in Normative Systems (FINS) that measures the influence 
of financial incentives on social norms and the subsequent effects on behaviors, 
including after financial incentives have ended. In a public good experiment, they 
found that both financial incentives and measured descriptive norms (people’s 
perceptions of prevalent behavior) contributed to increased contributions to a 
public good that benefitted the group as a whole as opposed to private goods 
that benefitted people only individually. At the same time, over the course of the 
experiment the financial incentive weakened the effect of descriptive norms on 
contributions to the public good, and the weakening effect was present even after 
the incentive had ended. In sum, they found that introducing and then removing 
a financial incentive led to an overall decline in contributions to the public good 
compared to a group that never received incentives.
This paper builds on the previous work by Lapinski et al. (2017), offering two 
main advances. First, it tests the model in a framed field experiment as opposed 
to a context-free lab experiment. Second, using a more thorough investigation 
of social norms, it explores the role of both descriptive norms and injunctive 
norms (perceptions about what people in a social group believe to be appropriate 
behavior) to reduce motivation crowding out or perhaps stimulate crowding in. 
The experiment tests the effects of both a temporary financial incentive and an 
injunctive norms message in support of the behavior. The details are described 
below.
The setting for our experiment is in the Sanjiangyuan region on the Tibetan 
Plateau in Qinqhai Province, China. The population consists mainly of ethnically 
Tibetan pastoralists, who traditionally lived a nomadic lifestyle. The Sanjiangyuan 
context is interesting for several reasons. A vast, sparsely populated area covering 
over 360,000 square kilometers, Sanjiangyuan comprises mountainous grasslands 
threaded with streams that converge to become the headwaters of three great riv-
ers of China and Southeast Asia: the Yangtze, the Yellow and the Mekong. These 
rivers provide freshwater to over a billion people in the region. The Chinese gov-
ernment is concerned that degradation of the grasslands threatens the water sup-
ply to the river systems and thus to the security of the country as a whole. As part 
of a restoration strategy, the government has promoted resettlement of pastoral-
ists to towns and cities (Du 2012). The area is also home to numerous threatened 
wildlife species such as snow leopards, Tibetan wolves and Tibetan antelope. The 
Chinese government introduced financial incentives for grassland management in 
2003 and expanded them in 2005 with the Sanjiangyuan Ecological Conservation 
Program (Fang 2013). In 2016, a pilot project began to turn Sanjiangyuan into 
a national park. As part of this effort, a payment system is being introduced to 
recruit wildlife patrollers from each household living inside the national park area 
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(Sina News 2018). Past policies were often introduced without a great deal of 
consultation or clear framing, but the recent work to design the national park and 
the conservation role of local people builds on more than a decade of closer col-
laboration with environmental NGOs working in the area (Shen and Tan 2012; 
Foggin 2018).
Conservation organizations are also working with local institutions such as 
monasteries to promote wildlife conservation, because Tibetan Buddhism consid-
ers wildlife and their habitat to be sacred (Li et al. 2014). Still, efforts to promote 
wildlife conservation remain complicated by practical challenges. For example, 
blue sheep may compete for scarce grazing resources with domesticated yaks; 
snow leopards and wolves occasionally prey on yaks; bears occasionally raid 
houses; etc. (Worthy and Foggin 2008).
Another important contextual factor is the history of top-down national direc-
tives regarding grassland management that disrupt traditional resource man-
agement practices of pastoralists (Bum 2018). In many countries worldwide, 
pastoralism has posed challenges to governments trying to promote development 
on terms more familiar to sedentary people (e.g. Homewood 2004; Little 2014), 
and China is no exception. Over the years, fluctuation of grassland policies has 
brought uncertainty and skepticism regarding government motives (Bum 2018). 
Early policies promoted collectivization and more intensive stocking, but these 
gave way to new policies of privatization (Yeh and Gaerrang 2011), herd size 
resettlement, and resettlement away from the grasslands (Foggin 2008).
In the experiment, participants must choose whether or not to participate in 
patrols against illegal trapping of wildlife. Participating in a wildlife patrol is con-
sidered to be prestigious among local people because it pleases the mountain dei-
ties (Bum 2016). On the other hand, it is arduous and time-consuming work that 
also involves costs of gasoline and wear and tear on vehicles. An environment in 
which payment for patrolling is being introduced into an area where practical con-
cerns about the competitive relationship between wildlife and local livelihoods 
are juxtaposed with the cultural traditions and norms favoring conservation, is an 
ideal context for applying our model. The history of top-down policies brings an 
additional layer of complexity in interpreting the results of our study.
2. Financial incentives in normative systems (FINS) model
We apply the FINS model introduced by Lapinski et al. (2017) and further described 
by Kerr et al. (2017). When a financial incentive (or any other intervention) is used 
to promote behavior change, it is assumed to directly affect the behavior in ques-
tion, but it also may affect social norms related to that behavior. The effect on 
norms may be direct or indirect. For example, when a behavior becomes more 
prevalent in response to a financial incentive, people may perceive this increased 
prevalence (i.e. descriptive norms), which might influence their inclination to 
adopt the behavior. They may also perceive that the increased prevalence of the 
behavior is only the result of the payment and this may influence their perceptions 
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about the extent to which people believe the behavior is worth doing (injunctive 
norms). Alternatively, people could perceive that if some entity (e.g. a government 
or a donor organization) is paying to promote the behavior it must be important, 
and perhaps this could reinforce any previously existing injunctive norm. These 
are just illustrations of possible ways in which norms could influence behavior.
As mentioned, Lapinski et al. (2017) tested a portion of this model using a 
public goods experiment. Using survey questions over the course of the experi-
ment, they tracked participants’ perceived descriptive norms for contributing 
to the public good alongside actual prevalence of such contributions (called 
 collective norms). They found that participants’ contributions to the public good 
increased with financial incentives and with perceived descriptive norms regard-
ing such contributions. However, they also found that financial incentives weak-
ened the effects of perceived descriptive norms, even after the incentives had 
been removed. In addition, removal of a temporary financial incentive reduced 
contribution to the public good, relative to before the incentive had been provided 
and relative to participants who had never received an incentive. This suggests 
motivation crowding out due to introduction followed by removal of incentives.
While Lapinski et al. (2017) provided important insights about the interac-
tion of norms and incentives, their study only addressed descriptive norms, not 
injunctive norms. Questions remain about the role of injunctive norms both in 
contributing to motivation crowding out and the possibility that they could be put 
to work in support of a behavior about which there are strongly favorable public 
views. Specifically, in a behavioral payment program, perhaps framing the pay-
ment in a certain way, or coupling the payment with certain normative messages, 
could reinforce injunctive norms in favor of the targeted behavior, helping keep 
the injunctive norm salient to reduce crowding out or even stimulate crowding in. 
It is important to note that this approach is only applicable if an injunctive norm 
exists in favor of the behavior. Otherwise the message invoking the injunctive 
norm will not be believable and cannot be expected to have an impact.
In our experimental context, crowding out might occur if payments undermine 
the cultural norm in favor of conservation actions, or if they convey a sense of try-
ing to control recipients’ behavior (Bowles and Polánia-Reyes 2012). Crowding 
in might occur if a carefully framed payment were to reinforce existing positive 
attitudes, in part by demonstrating the authorities’ recognition and respect for the 
public’s role in environmental protection (Bowles and Polánia-Reyes 2012; Rode 
et al. 2015).
3. Experimental design and procedures
The experiment presented here is part of a larger research program between 
Michigan State University and Shanshui Conservation Center, a Chinese environ-
mental NGO focusing on biodiversity conservation. In Qinghai, Shanshui works 
to integrate traditional Tibetan practices into conservation actions (Shen and Tan 
2012). Among other specific activities, Shanshui helps organize local  herders to 
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participate in patrols against illegal wildlife trapping. The joint research program 
began with detailed qualitative investigation to understand local social norms 
around grasslands management and protection of wildlife against poaching 
(Lapinski et al. 2018), before proceeding to a survey and a field experiment.
3.1. Design
In our field experiment, participants decided how many days (up to a maximum of 
seven) they would consider contributing to a common effort to patrol against ille-
gal wildlife trapping and hunting. Each day allocated to the anti-trapping patrol 
contributes to wildlife conservation; a patrol consisting of one person reduces the 
number of traps on the ground in the designated area by an estimated 1% per day, 
but if four people work together they can cover much more ground and reduce 
the number of traps in the area by 10%. The more days of the patrol and the more 
patrollers per day, the more traps that can be removed and prevented. On the 
other hand, patrolling incurs costs in terms of both time and money (for gasoline 
costs and wear and tear on vehicles). These costs are not explicitly modeled in 
the experiment, but local people are well aware of them because patrolling is 
an established practice. The experiment is conducted in multiple rounds; in each 
round each player decides how many days to allocate to patrolling, and then the 
exercise is repeated in subsequent rounds.
Four participants make this decision separately but concurrently. After each 
round, each player can observe the decisions of the other three participants, but 
no player can identify exactly which participant made which decision. The logic 
of the experiment is that it is in the collective good to protect wildlife and it is 
more effective to patrol against illegal hunting in a group than individually, but an 
individual participant faces implicit costs of doing so and cannot be certain that 
others will volunteer their time.
The experiment followed a 2x2 design with two treatments, with participants 
randomly divided into four groups. First, half the participants were assigned to an 
injunctive norms treatment in which they were reminded repeatedly that most herd-
ers in Qinghai believe it is important to protect wildlife. Second, half the participants 
were assigned to a treatment in which they received a temporary incentive payment 
for participation in the anti-trapping patrol. The exact payment level was unspeci-
fied as described below, but it was clearly a trivial amount that represented more of 
a symbolic payment than an attempt to compensate the costs of participating.
The experiment lasted for three phases, each containing five rounds, for a 
total of fifteen rounds. In the control group, the terms of the request to participate 
in the patrol was constant throughout the three phases. In the injunctive norm 
treatment, participants received the injunctive norm message in all three phases 
(rounds 1–15). In the temporary incentive treatment, participants received the 
incentive to participate in the second phase (rounds 6–10), after which it was 
removed. A fourth treatment group combined the injunctive norm and incentive 
treatments. All other experimental conditions were the same for all groups and did 
not change over the course of the experiment.
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The cultural context of our experiment prevented us from offering actual 
financial incentives. Based on previous experience with payments to community 
members for behavior change, Shanshui was concerned that any payment in our 
experiment would lead to expectations of future payment in its natural resource 
management programs that it would not be able to provide.
We offer three justifications for our use of hypothetical payments. First, unlike 
in a standard public good experiment, in our modified public good experiment there 
are not specific payoffs and opportunity costs associated with players’ actions, 
because the payments are hypothetical, as are the costs that a player imposes on oth-
ers through selfish behavior. The task for which payment would be offered is also 
hypothetical. From this perspective, our experiment is somewhat akin to survey-
based choice experiments, which routinely investigate subjects’ willingness to pay 
or willingness to accept basis without using real payments (Carlsson and Martinsson 
2001). The main difference concerns the interaction among the four participants.
Second, although economic experiments typically offer real payments, evi-
dence shows that it does not always matter. For example, in a set of framed field 
experiments in southern India focusing on collective management of groundwa-
ter, Meinzen-Dick et al. (2016) randomly offered payments representing returns 
to crop production in half of their experimental sessions, with no payments in 
the other half. They found no difference in behavior between the two. Survey 
responses afterward indicated that participants took the experiment equally seri-
ously regardless of whether they were paid. The authors concluded that the framed 
field experiments generated their own salience – payments were not necessary. 
Granted, additional research is needed to better understand when real payments 
are necessary or not necessary to generate salience for the subjects.
The third justification concerns the characteristics of our study population. 
Tibetans are known for taking promises seriously. A prevalent Tibetan saying that 
translates into English as, “Han Chinese live by written records/words, Tibetans 
live by spoken words/promises.” Indeed, this is one of the reasons for Shanshui’s 
interest in working in the area. In the context of this research, we asked the 
respondents to take the hypothetical payment very seriously even though it was 
not real. Shanshui officials suggest that, based on their experience, people in the 
local Tibetan population would do so.
The payment treatment in our experiment was framed as follows:
Imagine that the government has agreed to hire one of the patrol members on 
an ad-hoc basis, providing monthly payment in exchange for performing anti-
trapping patrols. This person would not be a regular employee but he would 
receive monthly payment. Imagine that people in your community who agree 
to patrol would be free to select which person becomes the ad-hoc employee 
and also how they want to divide up the payment among them.
The reason for this framing was twofold. First, it guards against a reaction by par-
ticipating herdsmen that a direct payment was possible for participating in an anti-
trapping patrol. Second, colleagues at Shanshui suggested that it is a  plausible 
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way in which the Chinese government might actually execute an incentive pay-
ment system to promote wildlife protection. Colleagues from Shanshui also sug-
gested that framing the payment in this way would represent official recognition 
and perhaps validation of the local tradition of patrolling sacred lands, while also 
recognizing local people’s authority as the ones who should protect those lands. 
Note that the amount of the payment was not specified and the participant could 
not know what his actual share would be; this means that the payment treatment 
focused more on the idea of payment as opposed to a specific financial cost-
benefit calculus. It also implies that the more people who participate in a patrol, 
the smaller each participant’s share of the payment. In addition, we know from 
Shanshui and other NGOs that have organized such patrolling that gasoline costs 
are quite high and our payment as framed would be far too low to cover them.
Data on social norms were collected throughout the experiment. In particular, 
after rounds 1, 5, 10 and 15, participants responded to survey questions regarding 
their perceived descriptive and injunctive norms. Additional questions asked only 
after round 15 inquired about their group orientation (the extent to which they 
tend to work with others) and their group identity as a member of a nomadic herd-
ing community. Table 1 contains the survey questions.
Multiple survey questions with Likert-scale responses addressed perceived 
descriptive and injunctive norms, respectively. Following common practice in the 
communication science literature (e.g. Rimal and Real 2005; Lapinski et al. 2017), 
we subject the multiple measures to confirmatory factor analysis, which extends 
correlation analysis to test the extent to which these items are similar in measuring 
the underlying latent construct (PDN in this case). This yields composite measures 
of perceived descriptive and injunctive norms. We tested measurement models at all 
four points in time followed by a test of the overall model. We assessed factor invari-
ance across time by examining confidence intervals around the factor loadings.
3.2. Procedures
We conducted the experiment using oTree, a software program designed for inter-
active experiments (Chen et al. 2016). Unlike z-Tree, the most commonly used 
software for laboratory-based public good experiments, oTree can be used in a 
field setting with a laptop connected to tablets or smartphones, without an internet 
connection. We ran the experiment on a laptop connected wirelessly to tablets that 
each participant operated.
The experiment interface accommodated illiteracy among many participants. 
On each participant’s tablet, instructions and procedures appeared both in Tibetan 
script and as optional audio files in the local Kham Tibetan dialect. Each participant 
wore ear buds while participating in the experiment so that they could listen to the 
instructions without disturbing the other participants. In addition, following Gore and 
Kahler (2015), Likert-scale survey responses used both numeric and visual scales 
to help illiterate respondents more easily answer the questions. [Examples of the 
experiment interface are provided in the experiment instructions in the Appendix.]
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Table 1: Qinghai survey questions.
1. I believe that most people in this group of four people doing this experiment right now are willing to 
join a team to remove traps. (PDN1)
2. Most people in this group approve of giving our time to remove traps. (PIN2)
3. The majority of nomads in my township think that giving time to remove traps is an important thing 
to do. (PIN)
4. The other three members of this group would disapprove of me if I didn’t join the team to remove 
traps. (PIN)
5. The majority of people in this group would be on a team to remove traps. (PDN)
6. The majority of people in this group think that giving time to patrol with a team and remove traps is 
an important thing to do. (PIN)
7. Most people in this group will give their time to patrol with a team to remove traps. (PDN)
8. I believe that most nomads in my township approve of giving our time to remove traps. (PDN)
9. The majority of people in this group would work with a team to remove traps from the landscape. 
(PDN)
I usually sacrifice my self-interest for the benefit of others. (GO3)
10. It is important for me to maintain harmony with others. (GO)
11. To me, pleasure is spending time with others. (GO)
12. I feel good when I cooperate with others. (GO)
13. My work as a nomad is an important part of how I see myself. (GID4)
14. Being a nomad is an important part of who I am. (GID)
15. How many of the people in this group did you know before today?
Please think about people in this group for these questions. On the whole, how similar do you think most 
people in this group are to you…
 Extremely similar  Not at all similar
17. Intellectually?  1  2  3  4  5  6  7
18. In the way they think? 1  2  3  4  5  6  7
19. In their values?  1  2  3  4  5  6  7
20. In their behaviors?  1  2  3  4  5  6  7
Notes:
Questions 1–15 are Likert-scale questions with the following possible responses:
Strongly Disagree/Disagree/Neutral/Agree/Strongly Agree.
1PDN: perceived descriptive norm.
2PIN: perceived injunctive norm.
3GO: group orientation.
4GID: group identification.
The data were collected in July 2016 in two townships, Zhenqin (Denchen) 
and Xiewu (Shewo) townships of Chengduo County, several hours’ drive from 
the city of Yushu on the Tibetan Plateau in southern Qinghai province. Attendants 
who administered the experiment came from these townships and recruited par-
ticipants through people they knew. All the participants were males who herd 
yaks so that, relatively speaking, they would have a common perspective on the 
experimental task. Each session included four participants. With 32 participants in 
each of the four treatment groups, the total sample size was 128.
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Three attendants facilitated each session, monitoring the progress and being 
ready to assist. An attendant read the instructions and participants answered a 
series of questions on their tablet to ensure they understood the procedures and 
were comfortable with the user interface. Any participant who answered a ques-
tion incorrectly had to repeat the question. Communication among participants 
was not allowed once the experiment began. The experiment sessions proceeded 
smoothly, taking less than an hour. Smartphones are common in the area, so par-
ticipants had no trouble using the tablets and software. Attendants reported that 
the participants generally found the sessions interesting and enjoyable.
4. Hypotheses
This experiment tests several key hypotheses stemming from our model, as fol-
lows. The first few hypotheses set the stage, and the last few test the key areas of 
interest in our model.
H1: Financial incentives for a socially desirable behavior will increase that behav-
ior when the financial incentive is in place.
This hypothesis is straightforward; it tests whether financial incentives have their 
usual expected effect. This test is important given the unique study population.
H2: A particular behavior increases with (i) the collective descriptive norm and 
(ii) perceived descriptive norm regarding prevalence of that behavior.
H2 is in line with the FINS model as described above, including the findings of 
Lapinski et al. (2017). It is also consistent with the information cascade literature 
(Banerjee 1992; Bikhchandani et al. 1992). When someone perceives that others 
are behaving in a certain way, they might believe that the payoff from doing so 
must be higher, leading them to engage in that behavior as well.
H3: Perceived injunctive norms in favor of a particular behavior will increase 
prevalence of that behavior.
The communication literature has found that perceptions of injunctive norms have 
both direct and moderated effects on behaviors (Rimal and Real 2005; Lapinski 
et al. 2014). In addition, when injunctive norms interact with descriptive norms, 
they heighten the effect of descriptive norms on behavior.
H4: An injunctive norms appeal in favor of a behavior will increase the perceived 
injunctive norms in favor of it.
This hypothesis serves two purposes. First, it is a manipulation check in our 
experiment: does a treatment in which some people receive a message about the 
injunctive norm affect their perception of the injunctive norm? Second, it also has 
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practical implications as a message to reiterate injunctive norms in favor of a cer-
tain behavior would be an obvious component of a norms-based effort to reduce 
crowding out or promote crowding in.
H5: Financial incentives for undertaking a behavior will reduce the perceived 
injunctive norm in favor of that behavior.
This hypothesis addresses a possible explanation for motivation crowding out 
from the FINS model that if people know that others are participating in a behavior 
because they are being paid for it, they may draw the conclusion that the behavior 
is only worth doing in exchange for payment, thus weakening the injunctive norm 
for that behavior. This hypothesis focuses on the direct effects of incentives on 
perceived norms without accounting for the information accompanying the incen-
tive, a point we return to below.
H6: Recipients of a financial incentive for a behavior will exhibit a greater reduc-
tion in that behavior once the incentive is removed, compared to those who do not 
receive a financial incentive.
This is the basic motivation crowding out hypothesis first tested by Deci (1971), 
that introducing and then removing a financial incentive can reduce a given behav-
ior below what it would have been had the financial incentive never been intro-
duced. It is consistent with the experimental findings of Lapinski et al. (2017). 
Like H5, H6 focuses on the direct effects of incentives without accounting for 
information accompanying the incentive.
H7: A stronger perceived injunctive norm in favor of a behavior will reduce or 
reverse negative effects of removing a financial incentive on that behavior.
This hypothesis, which is related to H3, reflects the most important contribution of 
this paper. It addresses our main interest of trying to mitigate motivation crowd-
ing out via injunctive social norms treatments, i.e. reminding participants that the 
social group to which they belong strongly supports the behavior in question, or 
by framing a payment in a way that promotes rather than undermines an injunctive 
norm in favor of the behavior. The theory behind these treatments is that they make 
injunctive norms salient and, by doing so, enhance their effects on action.
5. Results
5.1. Descriptive analysis
Figure 1 displays the mean number of days volunteered by round and treat-
ment group, and Figure 2 shows the same but by phase as opposed to by round. 
Recall that in treatments 3 and 4, incentive payments are offered only in phase 2 
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Figure 1: Mean days volunteered for anti-trapping patrol (vertical axis) by treatment and round 
(horizontal axis).
Note: Treatments: Control, Injunctive norms (IN) message, payment, injunctive norms (IN) 
message+payment.
442 John M. Kerr et al.
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3
Control IN message Payment Payment & IN msg
Figure 2: Mean days volunteered for anti-trapping patrol (vertical axis) by treatment and phase 
(horizontal axis).
Note: Treatments: Control, Injunctive norms (IN) message, payment, injunctive norms (IN) 
message+payment.
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(rounds 6–10), and in treatments 2 and 4, injunctive norms messages are offered 
in all rounds.
Figures 1 and 2 show that the initial number of days volunteered is high in all 
treatment groups. This can be attributed both to the initially high willingness to 
engage in patrolling against illegal hunting and to the fact that the experiment is 
hypothetical. It has been long established that people overstate their willingness 
to undertake certain actions when the question is only hypothetical (Murphy et al. 
2005; Norwood and Lusk 2011).
On the other hand, the number of days is not constant across the groups at the 
start of the experiment, and this variation is not related to the injunctive norms 
treatments. Figures 1 and 2 also show that payments in rounds 6–10 (phase 2) 
slightly raise the number of days volunteered relative to the groups that did not 
receive payments – the gap in the number of days volunteered across these groups 
is highest during this part of the experiment. Figures 1 and 2 show no decline in the 
number of days volunteered for participants who received an incentive payment 
after that payment was removed, relative to people who never received a payment.
Figures 3 and 4 show the evolution of measures of perceived descriptive norms 
(PDN) and perceived injunctive norms (PIN), respectively, over the course of the 
experiment. As introduced above, these measures are based on survey responses 
collected after rounds 1, 5, 10 and 15.
Norms research shows that it is PDN that influences behavior more than actual 
prevalence of behavior, i.e. collective norms (Lapinski and Rimal 2005). The two 
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Round 1  Round 5  Round 10  Round 15
Control IN msg Payment Payment & IN msg
Figure 3: Perceived descriptive norms (vertical axis) by treatment, rounds 1, 5, 10, 15 (hori-
zontal axis).
Note: perceived descriptive norms measures are a composite of responses to survey questions 
1, 5, 7 and 8 in Table 1, each of which reflects descriptive norms. Treatments: Control, 
Injunctive norms (IN) message, payment, injunctive norms (IN) message+payment.
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Figure 4: Perceived injunctive norms (vertical axis) by treatment, rounds 1, 5, 10, 15  (horizontal 
axis).
Note: perceived injunctive norms measures are a composite of responses to survey questions 
2, 3, 4 and 6 in Table 1, each of which reflects injunctive norms. Treatments: Control, 
Injunctive norms (IN) message, payment, injunctive norms (IN) message+payment.
are not always identical due to misperceptions of the prevalence of behavior. 
Figure 4 shows that, as with the number of days volunteered, the PDN for vol-
unteering to patrol against illegal wildlife trapping is high across all treatment 
groups, and also that it varies in round 1 in ways that we cannot explain. A com-
parison between Figures 2 and 3 shows that PDN follows a pattern fairly similar 
to that of actual days volunteered, i.e. it maps fairly well onto the collective norm. 
As with actual days volunteered, PDN rises over the course of the experiment.
Regarding perceived injunctive norms (PIN), Figure 4 again shows an imme-
diate difference across treatment groups, and also that the pattern for PIN matches 
that both for actual days volunteered and for PDN. The PIN is high in all groups, 
with relatively little change after round 1, although the average PIN score gradu-
ally rises over the course of the experiment for three of the four groups. The 
groups that received the PIN message do not have the highest PIN measures: one 
of them has the lowest average PIN among all groups and the other has the high-
est PIN. The two groups with the highest PIN at the end of the experiment, after 
removal of the payment, are those that previously received payment.
5.2. Econometric analysis
Table 2 presents the variables in the analysis and their descriptive statistics. In 
the basic ordinary least squares (OLS) econometric model, the number of days 
volunteered to patrol is the dependent variable. The explanatory variables include 
not only those directly related to our hypotheses (e.g. descriptive and injunctive 
norms, financial incentives, etc.) but also other covariates that could potentially 
influence the number of days volunteered (e.g. experiment rounds and phases).
Table 3 presents the findings for the regression of the number of days volunteered. 
Model 1 tests the effect of the injunctive norms treatment. Model 2 replaces the 
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Table 2: Summary statistics of variables in the model.
 N  Minimum  Maximum  Mean  Std. Deviation
Days volunteered for antitrapping patrol  1920 0.00  7.00  5.605  1.69
Initial group average days (in round 1)  1920 128  1.0  7.0  5.35
Collective descriptive norm (CDN)1  1920 1792  0.0  7.0  5.61
Perceived descriptive norm (PDN)2  512  1.00  5.00  4.45  0.76
Perceived injunctive norm (PIN)2  512  1.80  5.00  4.42  0.68
Injunctive norms message3  1920 0.00  1.00  0.50  0.50
Financial incentive4  1920 0.00  1.00  0.17  0.37
Post-financial incentive5  1920 0.00  1.00  0.17  0.37
1Lagged average days for other participants in the group (the non-self mean). Round 15 is excluded.
2PDN and PIN are computed using confirmatory factor analysis on the responses to survey questions 
listed in Table 1 designed to measure PDN and PIN, respectively.
3Dummy variable set equal to 1 for cases in the injunctive norms message treatment. This message is 
delivered in all 15 rounds.
4Dummy variable set to equal 1 for cases in the financial incentive treatment groups during phase 2 when 
the financial incentive is in effect, otherwise zero.
5Dummy variable set to equal 1 for cases in the financial incentive treatment groups during phase 3, when 
the incentive has been withdrawn.
Table 3: Estimation results: number of days volunteered.
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Initial group avg. days (phase 1, round 1)  0.10
(0.06)*
 0.11
(0.05)**
 0.11
(0.5)**
Financial incentive  0.12
(0.10)
 0.10
(0.09)
 0.36
(0.42)
Post-financial incentive  0.15
(0.09)
 0.13
(0.08)
 −0.28
(0.49)
Collective descriptive norm (CDN)  0.00
(0.06)
 −0.02
(0.05)
 −0.02
(0.06)
Own days volunteered in previous round  0.73
(0.06)***
 0.71
(0.06)***
 0.70
(0.06)***
Injunctive norms message  −0.01
(0.09)
  
Perceived descriptive norm (PDN)   −0.01
(0.08)
 −0.01
(0.07)
Perceived injunctive norm (PIN)   0.17
(0.06)***
 0.16
(0.07)**
Financial incentive*perceived injunctive norm    −0.06
(0.09)
Post-financial incentive*perceived injunctive norm    0.09
(0.10)
N  1792  1792  1792
r2  0.60  0.60  0.60
Notes: OLS regression; standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All models 
contain a variable for round (1–5) and dummy variables for phases 2 and 3.
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Table 4: Estimation results: perceived injunctive norm.
Initial group avg. days volunteered (phase 1, round 1)  −0.05  
(0.02)***
Financial incentive  0.11  
(0.05)**
Post-financial incentive  0.12  
(0.05)**
Injunctive norms message  0.03  
(0.03)
Collective descriptive norm (CDN)  0.12  
(0.02)***
Own days volunteered in previous round  0.16  
(0.02)***
N  1792
r2  0.07
Notes: OLS regression; clustered (by group) robust standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.10,  
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Model also contains a variable for round (1–5) and dummy variables for phases 2 and 3.
 injunctive norms message dummy with the measured PIN, and Model 3 introduces 
interactive terms between the financial incentive and the PIN. In Models 2 and 3, 
receiving a financial incentive payment in phase 2 has a positive effect on the number 
of days volunteered as expected, but it is not significant, thus not fully consistent with 
H1. This is not surprising given the high initial number of days volunteered. PDN 
has a small, negative, insignificant impact on number of days volunteered, not con-
sistent with H2. In contrast, PIN has a strong positive effect on the number of days 
volunteered, significant at 1% in Model 2 and 5% in Model 3. This result supports 
H3. (Note however that the injunctive norms message (in Model 1) did not have a 
significant impact on the number of volunteered.) The results also show that receiving 
a financial incentive in phase 2 but then having it removed has an insignificant impact 
on the number of days volunteered in phase 3, but it has opposite signs in Models 2 
and 3. We return to questions about the effects of withdrawing payment below.
Table 4 tests H4 and H5 regarding the effect on PIN of the financial incen-
tive and the injunctive norms message, respectively. In Table 4 we see that the 
injunctive norms message has no effect on PIN, which is inconsistent with H4. 
On the other hand, the prevalence of volunteering among participants in the pre-
vious round has a positive effect on PIN; this suggests that high prevalence of 
the behavior signals to people that others believe that it is important, consistent 
with Farrow et al. (2017). The striking findings in this table are the positive and 
significant coefficients of the financial incentive and the post-financial incentive 
variables. They signal that the incentive payment raises the injunctive norm, and 
that this effect persists even after withdrawal of the temporary payment. The for-
mer result directly contradicts H5. We return to these results below.
We examine multiple models to test H7, whether a PIN in favor of undertaking 
a behavior mitigates the negative effect of removing a payment for that  behavior. 
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In Table 3, we test whether PIN moderates the effect of the post-financial incen-
tive variable on the number of days volunteered. As discussed above, we know 
that neither receiving a financial incentive nor having the incentive taken away 
has a significant effect on days volunteered. In Table 3, model 3, we see the results 
of interacting 1) the incentive and the PIN, and 2) removal of the incentive and the 
PIN. Neither of these interactive variables has a statistically significant effect on 
the number of days volunteered.
On the other hand, we know from Table 3 that PIN has a strong, positive effect 
on days volunteered, and we know from Table 4 that payment and post-payment 
both have a significant and positive effect on PIN. This suggests a new hypothe-
sis: that payment and post-payment can indirectly raise the number of days volun-
teered, mediated by PIN. Tables 5 and 6 present the findings of the standard Sobel 
mediation test of this new hypothesis. The procedure involves three OLS regres-
sions: 1) the mediator (perceived injunctive norms) regressed on the exogenous 
variable (financial incentive or post-incentive), 2) the dependent variable (days 
Table 5: Mediation model: regression of days volunteered on perceived injunctive norms (medi-
ator) and payment (exogenous variable).
Panel A: regression of perceived injunctive norms (mediator) on financial incentive
Model 1
Financial incentive 0.06
(0.03)*
Constant 1.02
(0.08)***
N 1792
r2 0.66
F 435.5
Panel B: regression of days volunteered on perceived injunctive norms (mediator) and financial incentive 
(exogenous variable)
 Model 2  Model 3
Perceived injunctive norms (mediator)   0.17
(0.08)***
Financial incentive (independent variable)  0.10
(0.09)
 0.09
(0.9)
Constant  0.39
(0.28)
 −0.26
(0.22)
N  1792  1792
r2  0.6  0.6
F  337.09  301.44
Notes: Control variables: initial group average days, collective descriptive norm, own number of days 
volunteered in previous round, perceived descriptive norm, round, phase 1, phase 2.
OLS regression; standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; Sobel-Goodman 
Tests indicate 31% of the variance in perceived descriptive norms is explained by the mediator, Sobel 
coefficient=0.032; SE=0.018, z=1.82, p=0.10.
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Table 6: Mediation model: regression of days volunteered on perceived injunctive norms (medi-
ator) and post-payment (exogenous variable).
Panel A: regression of perceived injunctive norms (mediator) on post-financial incentive
 Model 1
Post-financial incentive  0.07
(0.03)**
Constant  1.01
(0.08)***
N  1792
r2  0.65
F  436.09
Panel B: regression of days volunteered on perceived injunctive norms (mediator) and post-financial 
incentive (exogenous variable)
 Model 2  Model 3
Perceived injunctive norms (mediator)   0.17
(0.07)***
Post-financial incentive (independent variable)  0.13
(0.11)
 0.12
(0.09)
Constant   −0.26
(0.22)
N  1792  1792
r2  0.6  0.6
F  337.4  301.67
Notes: Control variables: initial group average days, collective descriptive norm, own number of days 
volunteered in previous round, perceived descriptive norm, round, phase 1, phase 2.
Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; Sobel-Goodman Tests indicate 28% 
of the variance in perceived descriptive norms is explained by the mediator, Sobel coefficient=0.037; 
SE=0.017, z=2.12, p=0.05.
volunteered) regressed on the exogenous variable, and 3) the dependent variable 
(days volunteered) regressed on both the exogenous variable and the mediator.
The mediation model confirms that both the financial incentive and post-
financial incentive variables indirectly affect the number of days volunteered, via 
their effects on PIN and the direct effect of PIN in raising the number of days.
6. Discussion and conclusion
This research was driven by concerns about motivation crowding of financial 
incentives, the possibility that social norms might play a role, and the lack of 
measurement of such a relationship in the literature. The research reported here 
measures participants’ perceived descriptive and injunctive norms over the course 
of the experiment to see how financial incentives affect the norms and how the 
norms in turn affect behavior.
The focus of the study is a unique population of Tibetan herders in Qinghai 
Province, China. This population is characterized by a strong tradition of  protecting 
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wildlife and other natural resources, and upheaval in livelihood systems driven in 
part by top-down policies that encourage destocking and resettlement. Currently, 
the Chinese government is expanding the use of PES in the area including for 
wildlife patrolling, so it is an interesting context in which to test the FINS model.
Our test of the model is based on a framed field experiment, contextualized 
around decisions of whether and how much to participate in patrolling against 
illegal wildlife trapping. Treatments included a temporary financial incentive 
and a message reminding people of local injunctive norms in favor of patrolling 
against illegal trapping. The incentive is for a small, unspecified amount, unlikely 
to shift the cost-benefit calculus in favor of participating.
Our key finding is that perceived injunctive norms had a strong, positive, and 
statistically significant effect on participation. Moreover, the incentive payment 
had a strong, positive and statistically significant impact on the perceived injunc-
tive norm, and this effect remained even after the payment had been withdrawn. In 
other words, even when the payment had been removed, the PIN was higher among 
participants who had previously received a payment, relative to before they had 
received the payment and relative to participants who had not received a payment. 
A mediation model confirms that the payment indirectly raised participation in anti-
trapping patrols through its effect on PIN, even though it did not have a direct effect. 
As mentioned, the small incentive would not have been enough to make patrolling 
profitable; rather, our analysis suggests that its effect is through injunctive norms.
These finding represent support for H1, that financial incentives raise participa-
tion, but only through the indirect effect of increasing the perceived injunctive norm 
in favor of participation (supporting H3 and H7). In contrast, the findings directly 
contradicted H5, that a financial incentive would reduce the perceived injunctive 
norm in favor of participation, and H6, that removing the incentive would reduce 
the extent of participation. For the remaining hypotheses the findings did not show 
any significant effects. These include that collective norms and perceived descrip-
tive norms would increase participation (H2), that an injunctive norms appeal would 
raise the perceived injunctive norm in favor of participation (H4).
Our key result of financial incentives raising participation via their positive 
effects on perceived injunctive norms represents strong evidence of motivation 
crowding in by financial incentives. On the one hand this outcome is surpris-
ing, because previous experimental evidence documents crowding out much more 
frequently than crowding in (Deci 1971). Moreover, Bowles and Polánia-Reyes 
(2012) suggest that motivation crowding out will be more likely in cases when 
people already have a strong social motivation in favor of the behavior that is 
being incentivized. On the other hand, our finding is consistent with the idea 
raised by Bowles and Polánia-Reyes (2012) and by Rode et al. (2015) that a pay-
ment can crowd in other sources of motivation if it enhances self-esteem through 
social recognition. Discussions with Shanshui colleagues about the experimental 
results reveal that it is consistent with their work experiences in Qinghai. In their 
experience with Tibetan pastoralists, outsiders offering recognition of their envi-
ronmental protection efforts leaves a strong positive impression on them because 
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it validates their cultural practices, which they feel have been suppressed. In addi-
tion, the way the payment was framed, with the government hiring a local person 
on an ad hoc basis and inviting the group to divide the funds among themselves as 
they see fit, demonstrates recognition of local people’s authority to protect sacred 
lands, pursuing that protection according to their best judgement. This impression 
on participants would be particularly strong given their long experience with top-
down directives inconsistent with the local way of life.
A very interesting result is the strong connection between payments and injunc-
tive norms, even after their removal. A possible explanation is that by demonstrating 
recognition and validation of local cultural practices, the payment also acted as a 
reminder or reinforcement among participants regarding the importance their cul-
tural beliefs about this practice, and thus about the injunctive norm surrounding it.
Our finding is consistent with the conclusions of Foggin (2018) based on 
years of socioeconomic research on environmental conservation initiatives in the 
Sanjiangyuan region. He argues that community engagement and participation in 
the development of localized conservation approaches have been critical elements 
of successful programs.
Unfortunately, due to resource constraints and the great logistical challenges 
of conducting research in our study area, we were not able to test alternative 
arrangements for framing the payment, for example by simply offering it as a 
wage, with no connotations regarding the funding source or its intentions. This is 
an area for subsequent research.
Two important issues in our study raise caution in considering its broader 
implications. One is the fact that it was conducted with a unique population group 
of Tibetan nomadic herders who are strongly motivated by an interest in conser-
vation and who have had a difficult relationship with government policies over 
the years. Indeed, we selected this group specifically to examine responses to 
conservation incentives by a population that already had a strong conservation 
ethic. As mentioned above, stimulating or invoking an injunctive norm in favor 
of conservation is only possible if that injunctive norm already is present in the 
local population. Undoubtedly this group may respond differently to the scenarios 
raised in our experiments than others would. Testing the same model in other 
contexts will help us identify how robust the findings are; we are in the process 
of preparing such research. Second, as discussed above, the experimental setting 
made it impossible to test the effects of real as opposed to hypothetical payments 
and we cannot be certain that the effects would hold with real payments.
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Appendix
Instructions for participants regarding the use of symbols and pictures
In this activity we will use a lot of symbols in place of words. Let’s go over the 
symbols you will see on your screen:
When you see this symbol, touch the triangle (the “play” button) and you will hear 
a recording. You can do this instead of reading the words on the screen, which say 
the same thing as the recording.
 This symbol means “correct” or “true” or “yes.” When you are asked a 
question and the answer is correct or true or yes, touch this symbol.
 This symbol means “incorrect” or “false” or “no.” If you are asked a 
question and the answer is incorrect or false or no, touch this symbol.
 This symbol means move to the next screen. When you have completed 
the task on one screen, you can press this symbol to go to the next one.
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As you know, you and the other three people in your group will be asked to 
make hypothetical decisions about participating in patrols against illegal hunting 
and trapping. You won’t speak with each other, but we will give you feedback 
about what the decisions the other people in your group make. We will use the 
following symbols to indicate the number of days that each person in your group 
chooses:
*
*
*
*
When you see these symbols, please know that the red star represents you, and the 
three black ones represent the other three people in your group.
There will be some questions that ask you to indicate your level of agreement 
with a statement. A statement will be made to you that you can either read or lis-
ten to, and then we would like to know to what extent you agree or disagree with 
the statement. Your answers will be private. When the statement is made, please 
use the diagram of the boxes as shown below to indicate your level of agree-
ment. If you agree strongly, touch the circle below the largest box. If you disagree 
strongly, press the circle below the smallest box. The second biggest box indicates 
agreement but not very strong agreement; the middle box indicates that you are 
neutral (you don’t agree or disagree), and the second smallest box indicates that 
you disagree but not very strongly. When you touch the circle under one of the 
boxes, the computer will register it as your response.
